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Abstract
A cybersecurity initiative known as cyber threat intelligence (CTI) has recently been
developed and deployed. The overall goal of this new technology is to help protect
network infrastructures by delivering a capability to identify and appropriately act
upon threatening cyber activities in a timely manner. Threat intelligence platforms
(TIPs) have also been created to help facilitate CTI effectiveness within organizations.
There are many benefits that both can achieve within the information technology (IT)
sector. The benefits of CTI can be realized throughout the tactical, operational and
strategic levels of an organization’s battle-rhythm. A resourceful way to manage
and automate intelligence sources, provide situational awareness and integrate with
existing network protection tools are a few benefits that TIPs provide. The industrial
control system (ICS) sector can also benefit from these technologies, because most
ICS networks are connected to IT networks. When using indicators of compromise
(IOCs) from known ICS malware attacks and an open source intrusion detection
system (IDS), CTI and TIPs can become an effective cybersecurity tool. This research
shows how these IT-based technologies may help protect ICS networks. Three known
malware attack scenarios are used to showcase its likely deployment. These scenarios
are well-documented campaigns that targeted ICS environments and consisted of
numerous IT IOCs. Critical asset owners can obtain improved situational awareness
on potential attacks and protect their devices with the proper implementation of
CTI and TIP technologies. As a result, a capability exists that allows the possible
prevention or identification of a future ICS attack.
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APPLYING CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE TO INDUSTRIAL CONTROL
SYSTEMS
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Threats from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) escalated during the 2003 Iraqi
insurgency. As a result, the Department of Defense (DoD) initiated the Joint Impro-
vised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) with a mission to defeat IEDs
as weapons of strategic influence. JIEDDO uses all available sources of information
and intelligence for gathering imperative details regarding IEDs. Data that includes
how the device is made, how a device operates and where it is located are correlated
to provide troops a way to counter these dangers [13]. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) created an online 24/7 sharing resource called TRIPwire that allows
users to gain IED awareness and share lessons learned regarding counter-IED details
[30]. These efforts have led to keeping people safer.
Information Technology (IT) professionals are now applying similar information
and intelligence gathering techniques to combat malicious actions in cyberspace. The
creation of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NC-
CIC) within DHS in 2009 was the start of this initiative. Sharing cyber related
indicators of compromise between federal agencies and the private sector is the main
function of this center with the intent to better protect networks and infrastructures
[29]. In 2015, the President of the United States created the Cyber Threat Intelligence
Integration Center (CTIIC) with the mission of determining connections between or
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among malicious cyber incidents. This team will directly support the NCCIC and
other federal agencies in enhancing their cyber missions [20].
Industrial control systems (ICS) have seen an increase in attacks over the last
several years. DHS reported that there were 295 incidents in 2015, which is slightly up
from 2014 with 245 incidents [15]. These systems are gaining in popularity for attacks
because they were not built with security in mind. Availability is the most important
aspect for ICS devices, which makes implementing security difficult. Additionally,
these are mostly legacy systems that were built and installed prior to the Internet
revolution with no authentication requirement incorporated. The isolation that these
systems once had was considered their security. However, with the evolution of the
Internet, ICS’s are now increasingly becoming connected to internal and external
networks to increase efficiency [31]. There were 98,000 Internet facing ICS devices in
2014 [4], putting these at significant risk for attacks.
Due to the nature of ICS environments and operations, security needs to become
a high priority just as it is for IT systems. Both systems have uniquely different
purposes, but both absolutely need security to ensure functionality. Devices that
sense or trigger physical processes through direct control or monitor processes are
considered ICS. These devices are usually event-driven and include real-time software
applications with embedded software [4]. Common examples of usage include oper-
ation of industrial plant processes and equipment. Industrial sectors that use the
systems include oil and gas, water treatment facilities, and power and utilities. The
systems that include hardware, software, infrastructure and applications to transform
data and information are considered IT. A common example is an organization’s use
of computers, server and applications to conduct business. Security is vital for both
technologies; however, they can have different motives for why and how to be secure.
In terms of the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity and availability), IT is typically
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more concerned about security of data, while ICS’s are usually more concerned about
availability of the system. Electric power stations and grids use ICS devices to regulate
and maintain the electrical power throughout nations. These devices need continuous
availability and time-critical content to ensure uninterrupted day-to-day functions.
Safety implications can also arise from lack of availability of ICS devices. Within
IT systems, lack of availability can be often tolerated without any safety conse-
quences. The applications, operating systems and protocols that run on ICSs tend to
be uniquely different than IT systems. Therefore, these devices often create technical
knowledge and awareness gaps regarding security for conventional IT personnel [32].
The security needs of ICS devices need just as much attention, or even more, as those
of IT.
1.2 Research Hypothesis and Goals
This thesis examines the use of threat intelligence for cyberspace and develops
use cases for ICS devices. Three major malware campaign scenarios are provided to
show the potential effectiveness.
The overall research problem is to evaluate whether CTI and TIP technologies
can benefit security in ICS networks. IT networks can directly benefit from the
effective use of CTI and because of ICS’s relationship to IT infrastructures, CTI
should also benefit these networks. There are two goals that need to be achieved to
show applicability of these technologies. The first is the successful integration of CTI
and a TIP within an ICS network. The second is the successful employment of CTI
and a TIP in providing situational awareness of potential attacks which should lead
to better prevention and response to malicious activity in ICS networks.
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1.3 Approach
This research strived to model real-world situations and infrastructures. Historic
and well-documented malware attacks against ICS environments were analyzed and
used to perform experiments. A small network of virtual machines and physical
devices were used to mimic ICS infrastructure and conduct the experiments. The
experiments analyzed network traffic for specific malicious items. The use of open-
source material for cyber threat intelligence data was used due to its readily available
nature.
1.4 Research Contributions
This research establishes a framework for using CTI and TIP technologies with
ICS networks. At the time of this research, no attempts of using these technologies
with ICS environments were found in the research literature. Another contribution
is the analysis and inclusion of cyber threat intelligence within the ICS Cyber Kill
Chain.
1.5 Thesis Layout
Chapter 2 describes background details on these new technologies and establishes
context for this research. Chapter 3 provides details on three case studies and a
framework of using CTI and TIP with an ICS network. Chapter 4 presents the
result of using the framework based on the three case studies, while Chapter 5 offers
conclusions and opportunities for further research. Lastly, Chapter 6 explores initial
pilot studies that were conducted to get acquainted to these new technologies.
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II. Background and Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the details on CTI and TIP technologies. First, an in-depth
analysis will provide a solid foundation for the knowledge needed to understand how
these can benefit ICS environments. Use cases will be provided to establish how the
technologies could work in an organization. Lastly, an analysis will be given on how
CTI can be incorporated within the ICS Cyber Kill Chain.
2.2 Cyber Threat Intelligence
Historically, it was normal for ICS networks to operate without security concerns
due to their closed and proprietary nature [1]. However, with the evolution of the
Internet and organizations looking for the most efficient way to do business, ICS and
information technology (IT) networks have become interconnected. The challenge
with this new environment is that both types of systems have fundamental differences
regarding operations and cybersecurity. The core difference is that an ICS network’s
main security objectives are integrity and availability of the field devices while IT
networks are generally concerned about confidentiality of data. There are safety
and revenue implications that can arise from the lack of availability to ICS devices.
Consequently, ICS and IT technicians often have different perspectives regarding
security.
A new and emerging technology known as cyber threat intelligence (CTI) may be
able to benefit ICS and traditional IT networks. Research institutes (e.g., Gartner,
SANS, Forrester and Carnegie Mellon University) have developed formal definitions
of CTI (see [12, 22, 27]). Delivering a capability to identify and appropriately act
upon threatening cyber activities in a timely manner is the idea behind CTI. There
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are many ways to gather this intelligence. Methods include (but are not limited to)
security incident and event management solutions (SIEMs), open source intelligence
feeds, commercial feeds, users, and vulnerability and malware databases. From these
sources, indicators of compromise (IOCs) can be determined, documented and further
analyzed. An IOC is a forensic artifact of an intrusion that can be identified on a
host or network. IOCs are tied to observables and related to measurable events [8].
IOCs can be categorized as either network-based or host-based (common examples
are shown in Table 1). An indication of attack is the culmination of IOCs.
Table 1. Categories and examples of IOCs.
Email addresses, subject line and attachments.
Network Connections to specific IP addresses or uniform resource locators (URLs).
-Based Fully qualified domain names (FQDN) of botnet command and control
(C&C) server connections.
Presence of filenames or programs and their associated MD5 or SHA hashes.
Host-
Based
Creation or manipulation of dynamic link libraries (DLLs), registry keys
and mutual exclusions.
The crux of CTI is the contextual information surrounding attacks. This is the
comprehension of the past, present and future tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTPs) of an extensive range of adversaries. Included in this analysis should be
the connection between the technical indicators, adversaries, their incentives and
objectives and information about the targeted victim [12]. For an organization to
benefit from this intelligence, it needs to be timely, accurate, relevant and actionable.
The data needs to address incidents that are happening (or likely to happen) or
have actually been observed. These incidents also need to be meaningful to the
organization and help achieve security objectives [5]. This should lead to informative
and proactive decision making for protecting networks and infrastructures.
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CTI requires several essential characteristics in order to be effective. First, it needs
to be adversary-based. By knowing details about an adversary, an organization can
enhance its protection against their attacks. Secondly, the intelligence needs to be risk
focused. Securing an organization’s critical assets should be of utmost importance.
Next, intelligence collection and processes need to be well-documented and efficiently
executed. This will help make organizations think systematically on how to effectively
use the collected information. Lastly, intelligence should be customizable for a wide
range of consumers. An organization will consume and act on information differently
depending on the role within that organization (see Table 2) [6].
Table 2. Levels usage of CTI.
Analyst Needs just enough context to determine if further investigation is needed.
Incident
Response
Needs extensive details to find other related incidents.
Chief Needs evaluation of threat on possible connections to other worldwide
Security events.
Officer
A main cornerstone of CTI is that it needs to be sharable so that malicious threats
can be thwarted worldwide. The last several years have seen a large number of CTI
feeds created and deployed. These feeds are developed and maintained by a number of
private companies, various government agencies and non-profit organizations. Most
feeds can be categorized into two groups: (i) commercial (fee-based); and (ii) open
source. Fee-based feeds contain more of the contextual information that makes for
actionable intelligence to an organization, whereas the open source feeds provide basic
IOC data with very little context. A few examples of each are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. CTI feeds.
Fee-Based FireEye, RSA, Symantec, Recorded Future, Secure Works and Verisign.
Open
Source
DHS, Hail a Taxii, ThreatCrowd, SANS Internet Storm Center and
GitHub repositories.
The benefits of CTI can be realized throughout the tactical, operational and
strategic levels of an organization’s battle-rhythm. Tactical benefits will be seen
instantly with security teams addressing incoming IOC data immediately. As the
tactical level starts to connect IOC details, operational benefits will begin to form as
the context of an attack becomes apparent. The strategic benefits will be reached by
the culmination of the lower levels by providing a broad range of situational awareness
that will help current and future security initiatives. Table 4 summarizes the benefits
[22, 8, 6].
Table 4. Benefits of CTI.
Swiftly deal with threatening indicators.
Tactical Prioritize vulnerability patches.
Connect details associated with attacks quickly and accurately.
Improve insight into methodologies as attacks can be seen in context.
Operational Detect and remedy breaches faster.
Prevent future incidents.
Obtain organizational-wide situational awareness.
Strategic Understand the difference between a real threat and hype.
Determine IT security expenses based on risks and prospect of adver-
sarial action.
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2.3 Threat Intelligence Platforms
A resourceful way to manage and automate intelligence sources, provide situa-
tional awareness and integrate with existing network protection tools is to deploy a
Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP). As of this writing, there are currently a few TIP
vendors (e.g., ThreatQuotient (product: ThreatQ), ThreatConnect (product: Threat-
Connect) and Anomali (product: ThreatStream)). By way of comparison, Phantom
Cyber [21] claims ThreatQ can support 14 distinct services while ThreatConnect can
support 7, and ThreatStream can support 6. With the successful integration of a
TIP, an organization will have several key advantages:
• Timely analytics of intelligence from a wide range of sources and the creation
of a system of record.
• Threat intelligence visualization that leads to quicker connection and analysis
of IOCs.
• Allowing concurrent access for multiple users making existing network tools
stronger.
A Security Operations Center (SOC) is where the deployment of a TIP is the most
conducive. A SOC generally consists of multiple teams which are responsible for IT
control, monitoring and operations within large organizations (e.g., analysts, incident
response team and Chief Security Officer). Six key features that TIPs provide for
an organization when implemented with existing threat intelligence capabilities are
shown in Table 5 [17].
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Table 5. Features of TIPs.
Standardize ingestible threat intelligence for analysts into one platform.
Collect Import and parse open source, commercial feeds and ad hoc unstruc-
tured formats (e.g., email, webpages and social media).
Activate tasks for teams (e.g., network defensive signature updates and
IOC analysis).
Act Create reports to distribute content and alerts to organizational wide
users or a specific audience.
Provide unique enrichment and pivoting data to determine IOC connec-
tions.
Correlate Produce a convincing landscape of a threat with derivation of authori-
tative context.
Transform higher level data to use with lower level defensive tools and
SIEMs.
Integrate Create and provide signatures and data points for compatible IDS, IPS
and firewalls.
Create appropriate tickets with an organization’s current help desk sys-
tem.
Organize IOCs by threat actor, country or other common characteristics.
Categorize Gain insight into threat actor TTPs.
Mark indicators to offer context and relevance.
Allow collaboration and sharing among internal and external entities.
Share Provide workflow coordination among organizational teams (e.g., SOC
operations and help desk).
Export data in a sharable format so outside organizations can defend
against similar attacks.
2.4 Use Cases for CTI and TIPs
Providers of CTI and TIPs have documented use cases on how these technologies
can benefit an organization. The following are generalized scenarios and specific
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vignettes to demonstrate efficiency.
2.4.1 Generalized Scenario
The following is a generalized scenario of how CTI and TIP technologies can be
used within an organization [28].
2.4.1.1 Collection and Research
The process begins by having the platform ingest open source intelligence and
Homeland Secure Network Information along with user feedback and local defensive
network data. Some examples include free and paid automatic feeds, whitepapers,
government reports, emails, SIEMs logs and databases. Within these sources are
potential IOCs and contextual information that might be useful to an organization
to detect attacks. A TIP will use an included parser to automatically extract, store,
standardize, categorize, display and archive the incoming data from these multiple
sources. SOC personnel will monitor this process to ensure proper operations. SOC
analysts can perform further research on the data, which may lead to other IOCs that
will be manually entered to the TIP.
2.4.1.2 Approval Preparation and Approving Authority Ingestion
As IOCs are incorporated into the TIP, they are automatically classified with
a status of “Review” or “Active.” At determined intervals, data that is labeled
as “Review” is fed into a report for SOC management’s analysis of validity. This
process is completed with an email to the approving authority with the pertinent
information. When an organization has trusted sources (e.g., commercial feeds and
internal devices), a TIP can be configured to automatically approve and implement
that data. An approval process is needed to attest that an organization is satisfied
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with an analyst’s recommendations before IOC deployment into their infrastructure.
2.4.1.3 Implementation
Once IOCs are validated for distribution, a TIP can automatically format the
data for the appropriate defensive tools active in a network. For the indicators that
are denied because of their non-applicability to an infrastructure, a TIP will keep a
record to prevent duplications by other team members and provide a threshold of the
approving authority’s tolerance.
Figure 1 illustrates this generalized process of utilizing CTI and TIP technologies
with the open source IDS SNORT. Feeds, users and databases will provide IOCs for
investigation that eventually results in CTI. This intelligence will then be imported
into a TIP. The TIP will export the necessary data to network defensive tools (i.e.,
SNORT).
2.4.2 Summarized Vignettes
The following are summarized vignettes at the tactical, operational and strategic
levels. These provide insightful examples on how beneficial these technologies have
been for organizations.
2.4.2.1 Tactical - Stopping Attacks
Company A had a security team with many tools and processes but no centralized
workspace for collaboration or scalability. This resulted in team members having
different versions of collected data which led to confusion regarding current threat
status. A potential solution was the creation of a shared spreadsheet. However,
over the course of time that spreadsheet grew in volume. Queries on data resulted
in long wait times. In addition, the security team was without a tool that allowed
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Figure 1. Overview of CTI and TIP process.
in-depth malware analysis. Their network defensive tools were too strict to allow
any information to be captured, and no new intelligence was being gathered. The
company was eventually attacked by an advanced persistent threat (APT) and was
convinced a TIP was needed.
As a result of implementing a TIP, the company saw immediate improvements.
Productivity surged for the SOC personnel as the queries on IOCs only took a matter
of seconds due to the TIP’s ability to simplify searches. Automated data storage
allowed for a centralized and continuously updated database which provided efficient
situational awareness. Synchronization of the network defensive tools, processes and
data provided immediate actions for team members [25].
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2.4.2.2 Operational - Predictive Network Defense
While reviewing logs, a SOC team member responsible for monitoring a network
intrusion detection device notices a domain connection. A ticket is created and sent
to another team to conduct further analysis. This team used the Whois and passive
domain name system (pDNS) tools, which are common within a TIP, to recover infor-
mation on who registered the domain, a history of other associated domain names and
additional domains that resolved to the same IP address. Another included TIP tool,
ReverseWhois, showed other harmful domains that were linked to the registrant’s
email address. The relationship of all this data led to a high assurance of attribution
from one attacker. The attacker’s infrastructure was further unveiled when the dis-
covered indicators were incorporated into the TIP. Uncovered were other malicious
indicators which allowed the SOC to predict potentially future domain connections
[24].
2.4.2.3 Strategic - Strategic Planning and Security Requirements
Company A used the TIP to assist with strategic planning. Risk assessments are
better defined with actual and witnessed threat intelligence. The TIP technology
provides a knowledge source for threat data and incident-response efforts. This his-
torical record can be used to support strategic shifts in resources to appropriately
address threats. [26].
2.5 ICS Cyber Kill Chain Analysis
Most, if not all, ICS are connected to a traditional IT network in some way (see
Figure 2). Stakeholders that effectively implement IT CTI policies and procedures
will increase their ability to identify, track, isolate and hopefully prevent attacks
targeting ICS infrastructures. The same benefits that CTI provide IT networks can
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positively impact connected ICS networks.
At the time of this research, there was not enough data regarding IOCs related
to ICS devices. Therefore, investigation was limited to the IT vector.
■❚ ❉❡✈✐❝❡s
■♥❞✉str✐❛❧✴
❊♥t❡r♣r✐s❡ ❉▼❩
P▲❈
❍▼■
❋✐❡❧❞ ❉❡✈✐❝❡s
■♥t❡r♥❡t
❊♥t❡r♣r✐s❡ ◆❡t✇♦r❦
■♥❞✉str✐❛❧ ◆❡t✇♦r❦
❊♥❣✐♥❡❡r✐♥❣
❲♦r❦st❛t✐♦♥
Figure 2. ICS and IT sample network.
A team with the SANS Institute (Assante et al.[2]) developed a cyber-kill chain
specificly for ICS environments. There are two stages associated with their version:
(i) Intrusion; and (ii) Attack. The Intrusion stage will produce the most prevalent
IOCs associated with an attack. Figure 3 illustrates the Intrusion stage and how it
can be broken into 3 zones.
1. Internet: Threat actors will conduct reconnaissance operations, develop their
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weapon and choose a target.
2. Enterprise Network: This is where threat actors attempt or successfully gain
access to the targeted network. IOCs associated with this area could be the
malicious file information (name and hashes) and spear-phishing email details.
3. Industrial Network: This is where threat actors are conducting C&C opera-
tions, maintaining persistent access and preparing the malicious activity. IOCs
associated with this area could be unknown connections to IP addresses and
FQDN’s, DLL’s and any mutual exclusion or registry key creation.
Figure 3. Intrusion Stage of ICS Kill Chain with IOCs.
2.6 Summary
Combining the facts obtained through this background review, three crucial points
have been established:
16
1. ICS networks are commonly connected to IT networks.
2. Purpose of CTI and TIP is to enhance IT cybersecurity.
3. IT IOCs can be observed prior to the Attack Stage within the ICS Kill Chain.
This research will investigate a method for combining these three essential points into
one comprehensive process with the purpose of protecting ICS devices.
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III. Case Studies and Framework
3.1 Introduction
To accomplish the research objectives, a proof of concept needs to be created. This
chapter will explain three historical ICS attack incidents and how each had IT IOCs
that CTI will effectively employ. This chapter will also explain the implementation
setup and design choices for testing CTI and TIP technologies with ICS networks.
3.2 ICS Attacks with IT IOCs
A campaign known as Dragonfly was launched against a Ukrainian power company
that resulted in successful ICS physical impact. The campaign used a variant of the
BlackEnergy malware. The malware known as Duqu and Havex were not used for
attack purposes but to perform reconnaissance of ICS networks. For each campaign,
there are extensive detailed technical reports released by security companies (see
[18, 23, 16]). Examination of the reports indicated the attack vectors went through
the IT networks. Therefore, all have IOCs related to IT systems. This chapter
describes BlackEnergy, Duqu and Havex. Table 6 has a summary of these incidents.
3.2.1 BlackEnergy
In 2015, a Ukrainian power company, Kylvoblenergo, suffered power outages re-
lated to a cyber-attack. A use case was generated by the Electricity Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) and SANS Institute regarding this campaign
in hopes of educating ICS stake-holders [18]. The attackers used spear-phishing emails
to obtain valid credentials to gain initial access to the targeted networks. Included in
these emails were Microsoft Office documents that contained the BlackEnergy mal-
ware. Enabling the macro functionality of these documents allowed the malware to
18
Table 6. ICS Malware Attacks.
- An ICS attack with physical impact.
BlackEnergy - Malware was used for reconnaissance and stealing confidential in-
formation.
TTPs:
- Spear-phishing to steal VPN credentials and plant malware.
- Access ICS devices via VPNs.
IOCs:
- Email addresses and subjects.
- C&C outbound connections.
- Malicious MS office files.
- An ICS attack without physical impact.
Duqu - Malware was used for reconnaissance and stealing confidential in-
formation.
TTPs:
- Send emails with malicious files.
- Establish C&C to download other malicious executables.
- Remove itself after 30 days.
IOCs:
- Executable filenames along with associated MD5 hashes.
- IP addresses that are C&C servers.
- An ICS attack without physical impact.
Havex - Malware was used for reconnaissance and stealing confidential in-
formation.
TTPs:
- Spear-phishing with malicious attachments.
- Use compromised websites.
- Trojanize ICS vendor software via legitimate websites.
IOCs:
- Filenames and MD5 hashes.
- Registry entries.
- FQDN that are C&C servers.
start C&C communications via outbound connections. With the initial stolen cre-
dentials and C&C servers, the attackers were able to obtain network details, pivot
throughout the infrastructure and elevate their privileges. Once the attackers had
persistent access, they abandoned initial credentials and C&C connections. Virtual
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private networks (VPNs) were then used to access the ICS devices that controlled
the power breakers. In the end, approximately 27 substations were brought oﬄine by
the attackers opening up breakers. IT-related IOCs associated with this case study
could be the email subjects, email addresses, Microsoft Office file names and C&C
outbound connections.
3.2.2 Duqu
In 2011, Symantec published a report on a threat known as Duqu and confirmed
that it is almost equivalent to Stuxnet with the primary difference being the motive
[23]. The intent of the malware was to gather intelligence on a target’s ICS assets
and infrastructure. This data would then lead to a future attack in the same manner
as Stuxnet. This malware is primarily a remote access Trojan (RAT) and does not
have any ICS related code. It contains three files: (i) a driver; (ii) a main DLL; and
(iii) an encrypted configuration file. In a reported case, the malware was delivered
by specifically targeted email with a Microsoft Word document that executed a zero-
day kernel exploit. The infection process for this malware is complex and extensive.
Essentially, an installer injects the main DLL into services.exe and this begins a pro-
cess of extracting other harmful components, which are injected into other processes
allowing security products to be avoided. One of the components is responsible for
establishing several C&C server connections outside of the targeted network using
HTTP and HTTPs communications. Using these servers, the attackers were able to
download executables that enumerated the network, logged keystrokes and gathered
system details. This malware spread through a network using network shares and
peer-to-peer connections. IT-related IOCs associated with this case study could be
the filenames and MD5 hashes of the malicious executables and the IP addresses of
the C&C outbound connections.
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3.2.3 Havex
The campaign known as Dragonfly was discovered in February 2013 and report-
edly had an objective of completing reconnaissance of ICS components within an
organization [16]. Multiple types of malware were used to achieve the attacker’s goal
with the Havex RAT being the most common. The threat actors used three methods
of planting malware on targeted machines: (i) spear-phishing emails; (ii) watering
hole attacks; and (iii) Trojanized software downloads via ICS supplier websites. All
three methods required a user to trigger the malware installation. The emails con-
tained a malicious file for a user to open. The watering hole attacks occurred when
users accessed compromised websites and were redirected to other sites containing
malicious files. The trojan software used compromised ICS vendor support websites
by supplanting legitimate software with malicious software. Once the malware was
installed, the first task was to initiate a request to a C&C server via HTTP and once
established, multiple modules were embedded in the reply message and then executed
on the targeted machine. These modules were executables and DLLs whose main pur-
pose was to maintain persistence on machines by creating an entry in the Windows
Registry. Upon start up, malicious programs would run. It was reported that the
C&C servers were also able to update the malware on targeted machines because
of this persistence. This campaign was able to show that engineering workstations
that come back and forth from isolated ICS networks to IT networks are valid entry
points. IT-related IOCs from this attack include FQDN, filenames along with their
respective hashes and registry entries.
3.3 Framework
The previous case studies have provided foundational details for establishing a
potential framework for using CTI and TIP with ICS environments. There are a
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few technical and operational requirements needed to build a proof of concept. All
requirements need to function together to produce positive results.
3.3.1 Gathering CTI
The public site and secure portal for the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emer-
gency Response Team (ICS-CERT) has an abundance of data that can be used as CTI
for ICS stakeholders. Reputable security firms (e.g., Belden and Symantec) and cred-
ible ICS related open source websites (e.g., SCADAhacker.com) provide additional
and in some cases, more in-depth CTI associated with ICS environments. Pub-
lished alerts, advisories, bulletins, reports and white papers are all excellent sources
for gathering appropriate data. Open source materials from ICS-CERT, Symantec,
SCADAhacker and IOC Bucket were used to gather CTI on the Duqu, BlackEnergy
and Havex malware. Deploying a TIP to complement the incoming CTI is vital to
adequately managing the data and actions needed to enforce it. A TIP from the
company ThreatQuotient called ThreatQ will be used.
3.3.2 Deploying a TIP
ThreatQ was selected as part of a cooperative research and development agree-
ment between ThreatQuotient and the Air Force Institute of Technology. The com-
pany provided the necessary hardware and license for research purposes. ThreatQ is a
physical machine which can be deployed on-premises. Over 13,000 IOCs were entered
into ThreatQ from the sources mentioned earlier A key feature that the ThreatQ
device offers is customizable export options for data to practically any network secu-
rity device. There are some preprogrammed export options that are included with
ThreatQ, but the customization options make this product compatible with an orga-
nization’s infrastructure design.
22
A key feature that ThreatQ does not have at the moment is the creation of SNORT
rules from various data points. The platform relies on users to create customized
scripts to pull the necessary data. There are competitive TIP offerings by other
major security companies but due to the newness of this technology there are not
many. The most competitive offering is from ThreatConnect, which is a considered
a cloud offering. Currently, ThreatConnect offers the creation of SNORT rules from
crucial input.
Appendix A describes initial pilot studies that were conducted early in the re-
search. The features mentioned above were discovered during those studies along
with other important details.
3.3.3 Intrusion Detection System Selection
According to researchers with the SANS Institute [3] and Schweitzer Engineering
Laboratories [10], a deployment of an IDS with SNORT functionality will improve
security of ICS networks. SNORT’s open source nature coupled with its vast IT
security industry-wide adaptability make it highly recommendable for IDS purposes.
In recent years, ICS rule development within SNORT has led to key enhancements
for ICS infrastructures. Renowned security teams (e.g., Talos and Digital Bond) have
created specific SNORT rules directly related to vulnerabilities affecting ICS devices
and networks.
SNORT was selected as the IDS due to its open-source nature and widely praised
applicability. There are many key advantages that SNORT offers and listed below
are just a few.
1. Can be installed on various operating systems (e.g., Windows and Ubuntu).
2. Highly involved community of rule writers that include ICS experts.
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3. Ability to have rules automatically update when there are new and improved
rules.
4. Ease of customization to particular network and infrastructure needs.
SNORT was installed with Ubuntu due to the operating system’s ease of customiza-
tion. Creating and maintaining the scripts needed to create SNORT rules was
straightforward. Examples of SNORT rules can be found in Appendix C. Overall,
1,790 rules were created and imported.
BRO is another open-source and highly respected IDS option that was briefly
tested during this research. BRO can be downloaded as its own program or included
as part of the Security Onion suite. This IDS was not used during this research due
to the complicated nature of setup and integration. This program requires significant
experience and in-depth training in order to fully utilize its features.
3.3.4 Infrastructure Design
Figure 4 illustrates the infrastructure framework that will be used to show appli-
cability of using CTI with ICS environments. The ThreatQ TIP is deployed in the
Industrial/Enterprise Demilitarized Zone. A small network of virtual machines will
make up the industrial network. The SNORT IDS is configured on Ubuntu with the
industrial network. The configuration process created local rule files that contained
prevalent ICS rules from ICS-CERT, Emerging Threats and Digital Bond. Organi-
zations that have a desire for an even wider range of rules can create a free account
on SNORT.org and access their comprehensive rule files. This same virtual machine
has python scripts that can create additional SNORT rule files from the export func-
tionality from the ThreatQ machine. For example, a script can pull all malicious IP
addresses in ThreatQ and create a rule file that contains numerous rules. The same
can be done for malicious filenames, MD5 hashes and DNS requests. Two virtual
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machines will be used as engineering workstations with one running Ubuntu and the
other running Windows 7. An HMI device is also on the network running Windows
XP.
A few virtual machines were need to simulate IT devices within the industrial
network. A variety of operating systems were chosen to cover possible real-world
ICS environments. For example, if Windows XP machines were mentioned frequently
during analysis of the malware campaigns, that operating system was created. During
this research, Ubuntu, Windows XP and Windows 7 were the most commonly used
on IT devices in industrial networks.
3.3.5 Field Devices and Programmable Logic Controllers
These devices were not used within this framework. Currently there is not enough
data to associate IOCs to ICS devices and identifying the malicious activity before
any ICS devices are accessed is the main objective of this research. Field devices and
programmable logic controllers will be controlled by an IT device, which has IOC
data.
3.3.6 Validation
Validating that component operations are working as expected is essential to en-
suring framework functionality. The following validation was completed:
1. TIP ingesting CTI
A page of the Symantec Duqu technical report was saved locally and imported
into ThreatQ. The platform’s parsing function correctly organized the IOCs and
importation was successfully done.
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Figure 4. IT and ICS sample network with SNORT and TIP.
2. IDS Alerting
SNORT has a built in function that upon initialization, it will check all rules
and settings first. If any of those are not configured or set up correctly, SNORT
will abort and notify the user of the fatal error. The error would state the
line number in the appropriate rule file with a short description on what is
wrong. An example would be if a rule was not written in the correct format.
After setting up SNORT within the framework and initializing, no errors were
reported. Screenshots are provided in Appendix D.
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Each virtual machine was configured to have an IP address and connected to
the Internet as well as connected with each other. A simple SNORT rule to
test any transmission control protocol or user datagram protocol was created.
Each virtual machine visited google.com and the SNORT IDS alerted to the
connection. Screenshots are provided in Appendix D.
3.4 Summary
This chapter established the framework needed to show a possible proof of concept
that utilizes CTI and TIP operations for ICS situations. The three historical ICS
malware attack scenarios described will be used to demonstrate applicability within
the constructed framework in Chapter 4.
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IV. Results and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides analysis of the experiments conducted regarding the three
malware attack scenarios from Chapter 4. Presented are the results and technology
limitations.
4.2 BlackEnergy
The NCCIC, in cooperation with ICS-CERT, published an incident alert (IR-
ALERT-H-16-043-01BP) on 5 April 2016 related to Ukraine’s power outage [11].
Figure 5 illustrates the process of obtaining pertinent CTI and using a TIP and
SNORT IDS to alert to an IOC.
1. Collect: This alert document is pulled from ICS-CERTs secure portal docu-
ment library. Table 1 within the alert document outlines the IOCs that have
been observed regarding this attack. Included are FQDNs, email headers, IP
addresses, URLs and filenames.
2. Import IOCs: The table, which was six pages, was saved as PDF files allowing
for easy importation into ThreatQ. The report document was then imported to
ThreatQ.
3. Correlate and Categorize: After all the data was successfully imported, it
was correlated and categorized as part of the BlackEnergy malware family.
4. Share: If an organization intended to share this intelligence with outside enti-
ties, a simple export could be prepared for publication.
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5. Act and Integrate: Scripts were run to enable the Act function of the TIP,
which exported and integrated the IOC data into the SNORT IDS.
6. Alert: For this scenario, visiting a malicious IP address will be tested. Us-
ing the Windows XP machine (HMI device) an Internet Explorer window was
opened. Using ThreatQs categorization feature, a known BlackEnergy malicious
IP address was found (41.77.136.250). Within the Internet Explorer window,
that address was manually entered into the address bar. The IDS successfully
alerted that a malicious IP address was being accessed within the network.
7. Situational Awareness: As a result, situational awareness was obtained to
stop and prevent future attacks.
Figure 5. BlackEnergy process.
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4.3 Duqu
Symantec’s technical analysis report published on 23 November 2011 includes an
appendix that has many IOCs associated with the Duqu malware [23]. Screenshots
of this process can be found in Appendix A.
1. Collect: This report is accessible by a simple search engine query, ‘Duqu
Symantec Report’. This document included file hashes with the file compilation
date and name, IP addresses and a registry entry.
2. Import IOCs: The appendix pages of Symantec’s report were saved as PDF
files and imported to ThreatQ.
3. Correlate and Categorize: After all the data was successfully imported, it
was classified as being part of the Duqu malware family.
4. Share: If an organization intended to share this intelligence with outside enti-
ties, a simple export could be prepared for publication.
5. Act and Integrate: Scripts were run to enable the Act function of the TIP,
which exported and integrated the IOC data into the SNORT IDS.
6. Alert: For this scenario, a malicious file movement within the network will be
tested. A sample of the cmi4432.pnf (a known malicious file associated with
this malware) executable was downloaded from an open source malware site.
It was confirmed by using the MD5 hash found in the Symantec report. The
file was then placed on the Ubuntu engineering workstation. Using file transfer
protocol, the executable was moved to the Windows 7 machine. As expected,
SNORT alerted to the violation.
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7. Situational Awareness: As a result, situational awareness was obtained to
stop and prevent future attacks.
4.4 Havex
This malware campaign has been analyzed by multiple IT security companies
worldwide. Kaspersky Labs [14], Belden [16] and SANS [19] are just a few examples
with each report being easily accessible by a simple search engine query of ‘Havex
[Company name]’. Most reports provide in depth analytics of the TTPs. Screenshots
of this process can be found in Appendix B.
1. Collect: ICS-CERT’s secure portal has an all-inclusive excel file with multiple
sheets of data.
2. Import IOCs: After downloading the entire excel file to a local machine,
importing to ThreatQ was accomplished. A couple of the detailed Havex reports
from the companies mentioned above were also imported for reference.
3. Correlate and Categorize: After all the data were successfully imported, it
was classified as being part of the Havex malware family.
4. Share: If an organization intended to share this intelligence with outside enti-
ties, a simple export could be prepared for publication.
5. Act and Integrate: Scripts were run to enable the Act function of the TIP,
which exported and integrated the IOC data into the SNORT IDS.
6. Alert: For this scenario, visiting a malicious C&C FQDN will be tested. Ac-
cording to the excel file, www.swissitaly.com connection is a known IOC. Using
the Windows 7 engineering workstation and Google Chrome browser, that do-
main name was manually entered. As expected, SNORT alerted to the violation.
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7. Situational Awareness: As a result, situational awareness was obtained to
stop and prevent future attacks.
4.5 Results Summary
By using a few simple IT IOC data points, awareness of an potential attack
targeting ICS networks can be obtained with the help from CTI and TIP technologies.
Properly incorporating them into an organization’s security posture should provide
an advantage in preventing or identifying malicious activity.
4.6 Technology Limitations
These new cyber intelligence technologies have great potential but there are some
limitations as described below
4.6.1 Lack of Standards
Standards for the data structure and sharing this intelligence are still not agreed
upon. Directed by the DHS, the MITRE corporation started an initiative that cre-
ated the Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) language and Trusted
Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) delivery protocol for CTI.
However, these two are now in the process of combining into one standard, OASIS,
which as no immediate start date as of yet [7]. Commercial feeds operated by vendors
use proprietary methods for delivery, leading to more complications for organizations
[22].
CTI is not mature enough for most organizations to fully and successfully imple-
ment without signification customization. Offerings by vendors are currently vague,
which leads to confusion of which intelligence is actionable compared to second-rate
information. More time will be needed for the community to determine what in-
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telligence is actually useful and provide better tools for effectiveness. IP addresses
and MD5 hashes are extremely easy for vendors and government agencies to send
to customers. However, that can lead to organizations missing other imperative in-
telligence. Providers of intelligence are finding it very difficult to supply the TTPs
needed for proper defense [9].
4.6.2 Malware Attacks Only
ICS-CERT hosts an advisory website that lists specific known vulnerabilities in
ICS systems categorized by vendor. At the time of this writing there are 66 buffer
overflow advisories listed. CTI and TIPs will not account for this type of attack
because they are not considered IOCs but flaws in software and/or firmware designs.
Attackers can use a variety of exploits (e.g., cross site scripting and standard query
language injection) to obtain unauthorized access which do not leave an observable
or measurable artifact to constitute intelligence.
4.7 Summary
With some basic IOC data from well-documented malware campaigns, the frame-
work proposed in Chapter 3 can provide situational awareness towards potential at-
tacks for ICS asset owners. However, there are limitations that these technologies
currently have that may hinder their industry-wide adaptability.
33
V. Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the overall conclusions of the research based on the
results an analysis from Chapter 5 and provides recommendations for possible future
work.
5.1 Research Objectives
The creation of CTI and TIP technologies has shown great potential in enhancing
IT cybersecurity. With the current disturbing trend of threat actors targeting ICS
infrastructures, this research investigated the possibility of using these technologies
in protecting these vulnerable networks.
5.2 Research Conclusion
The capabilities of CTI and TIPs show great potential in cybersecurity for ICS
and critical infrastructures. These technologies benefit IT and ICS infrastructures
because of the connections these environments directly have in this ever-connected
world. Similar to the intelligence collection for IEDs, ICS cybersecurity will improve
with the evolution of CTI and TIP technologies.
5.3 Research Contributions
A framework for using CTI and TIP technologies within ICS environments has
been established with this research. The successful analysis of technical reports on
malware attacks provided appropriate threat intelligence. Proper deployment of a
TIP within an environment that could ingest intelligence while also exporting data
to security devices was accomplished. Implementation of an open-source IDS was
completed that allowed for alert capabilities that provided situational awareness of
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a potential attack. An integration of CTI, TIP and IDS technologies was built that
could provide ICS stakeholders a possible solution for an additional cybersecurity
measure.
5.4 Future Work
There are a few areas where future work will further enhance ICS cybersecurity
with these technologies.
• IOCs associated with ICS devices
Within the CTI community, there are currently no IOCs specific to ICS infras-
tructures. If the technology wanted to progress into ICS territory, what would
those IOCs be? Since ICS equipment measure physical processes, appropriate
IOCs could be abnormal physical instances. For example, an ICS IOC could be
the closing of the power breakers in Ukraine, causing power outages. Current
CTI and TIP technologies do not have a method to account for these incidents.
At this point, the process has obviously been maliciously compromised and ma-
nipulated. Future work should investigate into if ICS devices produce IOCs and
how, while being easily shareable across the community. There is currently not
enough data available to associate IOCs to ICS devices specifically.
• Creation of MD5 rules with SNORT
There is an abundance of CTI related to file hashes, more specifically to MD5.
Turning this data into vital SNORT rules would provide another layer of security
alerting. Future work should investigate how SNORT can analyze packets for
these hashes and the appropriate rule format to create.
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Appendix A. Initial Pilot Studies
A.1 Introduction
In order to get familiar and comfortable with CTI and TIP technologies, a couple
of pilot studies were conducted early in the research. These studies included an
exploration into setting up and using ThreatQ and creating intelligence.
A.2 ThreatQ
Upon obtaining the ThreatQ device, a familiarization period was needed to un-
derstand how it operates and its capabilities. This section will describe the process
of setting up the ThreatQ device, receiving CTI to the device and reporting of bugs
back to ThreatQuotient.
A.2.1 Setting Up
The ThreatQ device is a small, rack-mountable network appliance. Hooking
up a keyboard and monitor were initially needed to get the system operational.
ThreatQuotient supplied a First Boot guide that consisted of a few commands to
download the latest version of the software and to update it. The next step was to
create the administrator account and configure the IP address of the device so that
network users of an organization could use a web browser to log into it. The setup
was complete by successfully logging into the program via the graphical user interface
(GUI) with the administrator account.
A.2.2 Receiving CTI
ThreatQ has the ability to receive CTI from multiple feeds, both from open-source
and commercial sources. ThreatQ has a feature that allows easy access to feeds with
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just the switch of a button. All included feeds are turned off upon installation so that
an organization can choose which ones to initiate. Additional feeds are easily enabled
within the GUI.
To get an understanding of what vendors offer in regards to CTI, all of the included
open-source feeds were turned on. Additionally, a feed was created to collect data
from the open-source site of hailataxii.com, which is not included with ThreatQ.
Within a few weeks, around 400,000 IOCs were collected from these feeds. Data
included IOCs from at least ten malware families.
A.2.3 Reporting of Bugs
During this pilot study, a couple of bugs with ThreatQ were identified. ICS-
CERT’s secure portal site included a PDF document of SNORT rules regarding pos-
sibly ICS vulnerabilities. At the time, ThreatQ had a functionality to import SNORT
rules via PDF. However, upon attempting this, a failure occurred and these were not
imported. Additionally, a bug with importing IOC data associated with hashes was
also identified. When SHA-1 hashes were being imported, they were being catego-
rized as MD5 ones. A note was sent to ThreatQ’s support team to notified them of
these bugs. All were eventually fixed with proceeding system updates.
A.3 Creating Intelligence
A concern during the background phase of this research was the ability to obtain
and generate new CTI, as it is a key component. An initial option was to actually
create intelligence and a feed so that data could be sent to the ThreatQ box. Ul-
timately, ThreatQ’s ability to import PDF files was used to collect important CTI
related to this research. The section will describe the process of creating intelligence
and setting up a server to potentially share that data with others.
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A.3.1 Structured Threat Information Expression
STIX was chosen as the primary method for creating intelligence due to its open-
source, open-community nature. The MITRE Corporation has extensive resources
available to assist the community. STIX is based on the extensible markup lan-
guage (XML). All required packages were downloaded using an Ubuntu virtual ma-
chine. This researcher used the python STIX “Getting Started” resource on the STIX
Project website (http://stixproject.github.io/getting-started/) to create a sample in-
telligence report. This provided a basic knowledge on how IOC can be created from
analytics. Due to the extensive nature of XML writing, the option of creating intel-
ligence via STIX was not a priority.
A.3.2 Trusted Automated Exchange of Indicator Information
Once intelligence is created using STIX, a method to send that data is needed and
the TAXII protocol is the solution. At the time of this research, a project known as
Soltra Edge was the only open-source product that could accomplish this capability.
The product can be downloaded as a virtual machine image and then be installed
with an appropriate program. A complication became apparent soon after installation
as the current version of this program did not support the current version of STIX.
Therefore, any created IOC data with STIX would not be able to be sent. Due to
this disadvantage, using this product and capability was abandoned.
A.4 Summary
These initial pilot studies and experiences provided an solid foundation for this
research. Essential operational knowledge was gained on these technologies that en-
hanced research methods and objectives. The core of these studies was to obtain the
necessary familiarization to these technologies to better solve the research question.
38
Appendix B. Screenshots of Duqu Experiment
B.1 Duqu
The following screenshots were taken during the Duqu experiment. Here is a brief
description of each:
• Figure 6
An appendix of the Symantec Duqu report with all associated IOCs. Circled
are two IOC data points that will eventually be tested.
• Figure 7
ThreatQ’s record of both IOC data points from Figure 6. This shows that
within ThreatQ, Duqu is associated with these IOCs.
• Figure 8
Using the Windows XP virtual machine Internet Explorer to visit the noted
malicious IP address. At the same time, SNORT is alerting to the malicious
activity.
• Figure 9
ThreatQ’s record that the malicious filename is associated with a MD5 hash.
Using Open Malware website, downloading a sample of the same filename.
• Figure 10
Putting the malicious file on the Windows 7 virtual machine.
• Figure 11
Performing an FTP between the Windows 7 machine and the Engineering Work-
station machine. At the same time, SNORT alerting to the malicious action.
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Figure 6. Duqu screenshot - IOCs associated with Duqu.
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Figure 7. Duqu screenshot - ThreatQ record.
41
Figure 8. Duqu screenshot - Visiting IP and SNORT alerting.
42
Figure 9. Duqu screenshot - Downloading malicious filename.
43
Figure 10. Duqu screenshot - File on Windows 7 machine.
44
Figure 11. Duqu screenshot - FTP and SNORT alerting.
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Appendix C. Screenshots of Havex Expirement
C.1 Havex
The following screenshots were taken during the Havex experiment. Here is a brief
description of each:
• Figure 12
Part of Havex’s all-inclusive IOC spreadsheet from ICS-CERT’s secure portal
with a FQDN circled. ThreatQ’s record of the IOC and it’s association to
Havex.
• Figure 13
Using the Windows 7 virtual machine and visting the FQDN with an Internet
browser. At the same time, SNORT is alerting to the malicious activity.
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Figure 12. Havex screenshot - ThreatQ record.
Figure 13. Havex screenshot - Visiting FQDN and SNORT alerting.
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Appendix D. Sample of SNORT Rules
The following screenshots are a small sample of SNORT rules that were created
by scripts and ThreatQ’s export tool. Here is a brief description of each:
• Figure 14
Sample rules for any TCP, UDP and IP protocol connection to any noted bad
IP address. Connections from either inside or outside the trusted network on
any port is evaluated.
• Figure 15
Sample rules for any noted bad filenames. Connections from either inside or
outside the trusted network on any port is evaluated.
Figure 14. Sample of SNORT bad IP rules.
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Figure 15. Sample of SNORT bad filenames rules.
49
Appendix E. Validation Screenshots
The following screenshots are provided to show that SNORT was configured and
set up correctly and that it analyzed network traffic packets correctly.
• Figure 16
By using the command ‘sudo snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -T’, SNORT will
test configuration. The rules will be tested along varies other components. A
message stating that SNORT successfully validated configuration will appear
and then will promptly exit when test is complete.
• Figure 17
A local rule was inputted into SNORT to test packet analysis; ‘alert tcp $HOME NET
any ->$EXTERNAL NET any (msg: ”Out Traffic detected”; sid: 1000000000000)’.
The command ‘sudo snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -A console -i eth0’ will ini-
tialize packet capture and analysis on the first ethernet interface. By visiting
google.com, the SNORT console displayed the traffic. Upon exiting SNORT,
statistics were shown to the user regarding packet analysis.
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Figure 16. SNORT validation.
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Figure 17. Packet validation.
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